A Sign to Many No More: Supreme Court of Missouri Casts Away Church’s Sign Variance by Neuman, Matthew
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 83 Issue 4 Article 11 
Fall 2018 
A Sign to Many No More: Supreme Court of Missouri Casts Away 
Church’s Sign Variance 
Matthew Neuman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Matthew Neuman, A Sign to Many No More: Supreme Court of Missouri Casts Away Church’s Sign 
Variance, 83 MO. L. REV. (2018) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss4/11 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
 NOTE 
A Sign to Many No More: 
Supreme Court of Missouri Casts Away 
Church’s Sign Variance 




Depending on the context in which they are encountered, the conse-
quences of land use zoning may be viewed either as a saving grace – preserving 
or prospectively safeguarding the locality to similar compatible uses – or as an 
obstacle to overcome – hindering the development potential or use of a piece 
of land.  Although the level of concern may vary based upon the zoning district, 
homeowners in residential neighborhoods have a right to be particularly sensi-
tive to adjacent land use. 
Zoning separates specified land uses into delineated geographic districts.  
These distinct separations exist to accomplish certain objectives.  If a city’s 
zoning designation is similar to that of Kansas City, Missouri, a residential 
zone may be designated as “primarily intended to create, maintain, and pro-
mote a variety of housing opportunities for individual households and to main-
tain the desired physical character of existing and developing neighborhoods.”1  
As part of preserving the character of residential neighborhoods, concerns exist 
regarding the proliferation of signs.2  A sign ordinance may provide a mecha-
nism for balancing the legitimate need for signs with residents’ desires to pre-
vent their neighborhood from becoming overrun with unwelcome advertise-
ments.3 
 
* B.S. Environmental Geoscience, Texas A&M University, 2008; J.D. Candidate, Uni-
versity of Missouri School of Law, 2019; Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law 
Review, 2018–2019.  I am grateful to Professor Freyermuth for his insight, guidance, 
and support during the writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its 
help in the editing process. 
 1. KANSAS CITY, MO., ZONING AND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 88–110–02 (2018). 
 2. See id. § 88–445–01. 
 3. See Lynn Horsley, Neighborhoods, Schools, Churches Wrestle Over Digital 
Signs, KAN. CITY STAR (Sept. 14, 2014), https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-
government/article2120297.html (“‘Digital signs are aggressive,’ said [a] south Kansas 
City activist . . . , who worries a compromise will open the floodgates to everyone.  ‘It 
degrades the neighborhood.  We’re looking like Las Vegas and it’s going to be all over 
the place.’”). 
1
Neuman: A Sign to Many No More: Supreme Court of Missouri Casts Away Chur
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
1054 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
Part II of this Note explores the facts of Antioch Community Church v. 
Board of Zoning Adjustment of City of Kansas City,4 a case involving a church 
seeking a zoning variance for a recently updated sign.  Part III then provides a 
brief overview of the legal background of the case as well as zoning and vari-
ances in general.  Next, Part IV analyzes the court’s reasoning in the case.  
Lastly, Part V discusses how this case has created a stricter standard for non-
use variances in Missouri and analyzes alternatives. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
In February 2012, the Kansas City, Missouri, Board of Zoning Adjust-
ment (the “KC-BZA”) denied the request for a variance5 submitted by Antioch 
Community Church (the “Church”) concerning a digital display the Church 
installed as an update within its existing monument sign.6  Prior to the addition 
of the digital display, the monument sign – originally installed in 19567 – was 
of the type typically associated with small churches: a brick exterior surround-
ing a wood and glass frame with individual letters that could be manually 
changed.8  Ignorant of any potential ordinance violation, the Church expended 
over $11,000 in 2010 to replace the letterboard portion of the sign with a digital 
display; no changes were made to the brick surround.9  Figure 1 shows a picture 
of the sign and the adjacent road. 
 
 4. 543 S.W.3d 28 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 5. See infra Section III.B. 
 6. Antioch Cmty. Church, 543 S.W.3d at 31.  “Monument sign” is a term defined 
in the Kansas City, Missouri, Zoning and Development Code as “[a] sign placed upon 
a base that rests upon the ground where the width of the base of the sign is a minimum 
of [seventy-five] percent of the width of the longest part of the sign.”  KANSAS CITY, 
MO., ZONING AND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 88–810–175.  Unless otherwise noted, all 
references from here on to the Zoning and Development Code of the City of Kansas 
City, Missouri, will be to the January 25, 2012, version – the version in effect at the 
time of the administrative appeal.  This archived version of the code is available online 
at KANSAS CITY, MO., ZONING AND DEVELOPMENT CODE (2012), https://library.munic-
ode.com/mo/kansas_city/codes/zoning_and_development_code/141331?no-
deId=14867. 
 7. Antioch Cmty. Church, 543 S.W.3d at 40. 
 8. Id. at 32.  The sign was perhaps even more simple than the average church 
display, as it involved letters hung from cup hooks.  Id. 
 9. Id.  The funding for the display came from a bequest to the Church.  Id.  The 
Church members conceived the idea for the digital display update following a Church 
member’s donation for a digital sign board at Oak Grove Park in Gladstone, Missouri, 
to honor her late husband.  Substitute Brief of Antioch Community Church at 3, Antioch 
Cmty. Church, 543 S.W.3d 28 (No. SC 96215), 2017 WL 3195829, at *3 [hereinafter 
Appellant’s Brief].  The digital sign in that park was also surrounded by residential use.  
Id.  It, too, was in Clay County, Missouri, but, of course, not in Kansas City, Missouri, 
and not subject to this zoning.  See Antioch Cmty. Church, 543 S.W.3d at 31–32. 
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The Church property lays within a “residential” zone on Antioch Road,11 
a four-lane roadway connecting Interstate 35 (“I-35”) and Vivion Road.12  The 
lot, approximately three and one-half acres, is zoned “R-6.”13  R-6 zoning in-
dicates that the lot is in a residential district allowing one dwelling unit per 
6,000 square feet of gross site area.14  Religious-assembly use is allowed in the 
residential area; uses for fire stations, police stations, schools, and parks are 
also permitted.15  Commercial development exists where Antioch Road inter-
 
 10. GOOGLE MAPS, https://goo.gl/maps/MUJmft8Wgv42 (last visited Jan. 6, 
2019).  This image is from August 2014.  Id. 
 11. Antioch Road and many features in the vicinity take their name from Antioch 
Church – the predecessor to Antioch Community Church.  Appellant’s Brief, supra 
note 9, at 2.  That original church, constructed in 1859 and at the time “located in deep 
woods,” still stands, restored, on the lot with the new church building.  National Reg-
ister of Historic Places Inventory – Nomination Form, LANDMARKS COMM’N OF KAN. 
CITY, MO. (June 29, 1978), https://dnr.mo.gov/shpo/nps-nr/79001358.pdf; see also Ap-
pellant’s Brief, supra note 9, at 2. 
 12. Antioch Cmty. Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, No. WD 79676, 2016 
WL 7209821, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2016), rev’d, 543 S.W.3d 28 (Mo. 2018). 
 13. Parcel Viewer, KANSAS CITY, MO., maps.kcmo.org/apps/parcelviewer/ (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2018) (search “80061” in “City Pin:” search bar); see also Appellant’s 
Brief, supra note 9, at 29. 
 14. See KANSAS CITY, MO., ZONING AND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 88–110–01 
(2012). 
 15. Id. § 88–110–03–A.  In an R-6 district, the Ordinance’s Residential Districts 
Use Table indicates “Religious Assembly” is allowed, but the use is designated “P/S,” 
indicating it is a permitted/special use depending on its size as a function of lot size 
3
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sects with I-35 and Vivion Road, and commercial zones surrounding those in-
tersections permit digital signs.16  Approximately 14,000 vehicles per day trav-
erse Antioch Road.17  Figure 2 shows the location of the Church and its prox-
imity to these intersections. 
 
compared to building capacity or floor area.  Id.  §§ 88–110–03–A, 88–365–03–A.  Of 
course, this church would be a nonconforming use anyways, as it predated any zoning 
ordinance.  See also infra Section III.E.  Kansas City’s first zoning ordinance was in 
1923.  Frederick V. Wells, The Law of Zoning in Missouri, 34 UNIV. MO. BULL. L. 
SERIES 3, 8 (1926), https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti-
cle=1196&context=ls. 
 16. Antioch Cmty. Church, 2016 WL 7209821, at *1 (“The Church property sits 
within a sizable single-family residential zone that is bookended by commercial ar-
eas zoned B4 (the most intense business district), UR (urban residential), D (down-
town), and M (industrial), where digital signs are allowed.”).  To put the scene into 
perspective, this section of Antioch Road spans approximately 1.0 mile between I-35 
and Vivion Road – a three-minute car ride.  GOOGLE MAPS, https://maps.google.com/ 
(click the direction button to the right of the search bar; enter “4339-4361 MO-1, Kan-
sas City, MO 64117” in “Your location” search bar; enter “5025 NE Antioch Rd, Kan-
sas City, MO 64119” in the “Choose destination” search bar) (last visited Oct. 19, 
2018). 
 17. Antioch Cmty. Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 543 S.W.3d 28, 32 (Mo. 
2018) (en banc). 
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Figure 218 
 
 18. Data layers used to create this map are from Open Data KC, a service provided 
by the City of Kansas City.  OPEN DATA KC, https://data.kcmo.org (last visited Jan. 6, 
2019) (The following datasets were used to create this map: Cadastre, GIS Additional 
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In October 2011, Kansas City’s Director of City Planning and Develop-
ment issued a citation to the Church because the Church’s sign was not com-
pliant with the Kansas City’s sign code.19  The citation specified digital signs 
were prohibited on the property.20  The Church appealed the citation and ap-
plied for a variance – an administrative permission to depart from a zoning 
ordinance.21  At the KC-BZA’s hearing for the variance, the Church explained 
the history of the sign and the rationale for replacing the old display with the 
digital display.22  The Church pointed to the latitude that a digital display cre-
ated: A church member would not have to venture out in the elements to change 
the individual letters.23  Additionally, the digital display allowed the Church to 
increase the font size to inform passing motorists of Church news.24  At the 
hearing, a representative of a local neighborhood group testified in support of 
the variance.25  There was no opposing testimony presented.26  Without an ac-
 
Features, and Centerline.  For each of these datasets, the site claims a last update of 
May 1, 2014; however, some attributes do appear to be more recent).  Note that the City 
of Kansas City makes no claims as to the content, accuracy, timeliness, or completeness 
of any of the data provided at this site.  Id.  
 19. Antioch Cmty. Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, No. 12CY–CV02727, 
2016 WL 8416849, at *1 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Apr. 7, 2016), rev’d, No. WD 79676, 2016 WL 
7209821 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2016), rev’d, 543 S.W.3d 28.  An anonymous tip 
brought the issue to the City.  Antioch Cmty. Church, 2016 WL 7209821, at *1. 
 20. Antioch Cmty. Church, 2016 WL 7209821, at *1.  The Zoning and Develop-
ment Code detailed that 
 
[a] lot with an institutional use as its principal use, such as a church, . . . may 
have . . . 
. . . . 
[o]ne monument sign per street frontage which may not exceed [thirty-two] 
square feet in area or [six] feet in height.  One sign per lot may include change-
able copy, but the changeable copy feature must use direct human intervention 
for changes and may not include any form of digital or electronic display.  Such 
sign may be internally or externally illuminated. 
 
KANSAS CITY, MO., ZONING AND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 88–445–06–A.4(a) (2012). 
 21. Antioch Cmty. Church, 543 S.W.3d at 31. 
 22. Antioch Cmty. Church, 2016 WL 8416849, at *1–2. 
 23. Id. at *2. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at *2–3.  The neighbor testified, among other points, that, although the 
Church is in a residential area, the road on which the Church is located is a major thor-
oughfare, that the display blends well into the property, and that the “sign is unobtrusive 
when compared with the commercial activity in the area . . . .”  Id. at *2.  This speaker 
was a member of the board of commissioners for the Sherwood Estates Homes Asso-
ciation, a neighboring home association.  Transcript of Meeting of Board of Zoning 
Adjustment at 35–36, Antioch Cmty. Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, No. WD 
79676, 2016 WL 7209821 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2016) (No. 14255–A–1). 
 26. Antioch Cmty. Church, 2016 WL 8416849, at *2–3. 
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companying written decision, the KC-BZA denied the Church’s variance re-
quest.27  The hearing transcript indicated that the KC-BZA felt the Church did 
not “establish undue hardship or practical difficulty” and that the KC-BZA it-
self lacked the authority to grant the variance.28  Shortly thereafter, the KC-
BZA denied the Church’s appeal too, again without a written decision.29  
The Church’s zoning dilemma and the KC-BZA’s rationale for denying 
the variance request implicate multiple portions of the Kansas City, Missouri, 
Zoning and Development Code (the “Code”).  Section 88-445-12 of the Code, 
discussing sign variances, states that “[t]he [KC-BZA] may grant variances to 
the requirements for signs, except as to type and number, and except as to sign 
location and spacing requirements for outdoor advertising signs, in accordance 
with the procedures of [the sign development standards].”30  Sign type is de-
fined by the Code as follows: 
A group or class of signs that are regulated, allowed or not allowed in 
this code as a group or class.  Sign types include, but are not limited to, 
pole signs, monument signs, oversized monument signs, outdoor adver-
tising signs, wall signs, projecting signs, roof signs, ornamental tower 
signs, electronic or digital or motorized signs, banner signs, and tempo-
rary signs.31 
 
 27. Antioch Cmty. Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, No. WD 79676, 2016 
WL 7209821, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2016), rev’d, 543 S.W.3d 28. 
 28. Transcript of Meeting of Board of Zoning Adjustment, supra note 25, at 42; 
see also Antioch Cmty. Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 543 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Mo. 
2018) (en banc).  
 29. Antioch Cmty. Church, 2016 WL 7209821, at *1.  Although the appellate de-
cision notes that the variance request and the appeal were denied “without a written 
decision,” this could be more accurately described as a denial without a written expla-
nation.  The ordinance requires that copies of the written decision be sent to the appli-
cant within ten days of the KC-BZA’s decision.  KANSAS CITY, MO., ZONING AND 
DEVELOPMENT CODE § 88–575–10 (2012).  The letter sent regarding the variance 
stated, “At its regularly scheduled meeting on February 14, 2012, the Board of Zoning 
Adjustment DENIED a request for a variance to allow an existing digital display on an 
existing monument sign in a residential district to remain, plus any other necessary 
variances.”  Letter from Sarah Anzicek, Planner, Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, to Bernard 
Rhodes, Attorney for Antioch Community Church (Feb. 15, 2012).  Of course, the 
Church, having attended the meeting, would have been able to hear the questions and 
statements regarding the variance; they also would have known the outcome of the roll-
call vote.  See Transcript of Meeting of Board of Zoning Adjustment, supra note 25, at 
42.  Requiring a BZA to explain its position in detail in writing would make the review 
process streamlined.  See Matthew v. Smith, 707 S.W.2d 411, 417 n.8 (Mo. 1986) (en 
banc) (“While not deciding the point, it might be noted that both the ordinance [of North 
Kansas City] and a growing number of jurisdictions suggest that the [BZA] should issue 
findings of fact.”). 
 30. KANSAS CITY, MO., ZONING AND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 88–445–12 (empha-
sis added). 
 31. Id. § 88–810–183 (emphasis added). 
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A “digital sign” is defined as “[a] sign or component of a sign that uses 
changing lights to form a message or series of messages that are electronically 
programmed or modified by electronic processes.”32  In light of the above por-
tions of the Code, the report prepared by Kansas City’s Planning and Develop-
ment Department staff opined that granting the variance was beyond the KC-
BZA’s authority.33  During the hearing, the KC-BZA’s chairman also pointed 
to the fact that the KC-BZA had previously denied other requests to allow dig-
ital displays.34 
The Church then filed a petition with the Clay County Circuit Court,35 
“alleg[ing] that ‘[t]he [KC-]BZA’s denial of . . . [the] Church’s requested var-
iance and the denial of the [C]hurch’s appeal was arbitrary, capricious, illegal, 
unconstitutional and void because each was unsupported by the competent and 
substantial evidence upon the record as a whole and contrary to law.’”36  The 
day before the trial court rendered its judgment, the Church filed a supple-
mental petition against Kansas City for a declaratory judgment that the sign 
Code was unconstitutional.37  In reversing the KC-BZA’s decision, the trial 
court held that the KC-BZA’s decision was an abuse of discretion and that the 
KC-BZA did have the authority to grant the variance.38  It then directed the 
KC-BZA to issue the variance.39  Because of this outcome, the issue of the 
constitutionality of the supplemental petition was moot, and the trial court dis-
missed it.40 
The KC-BZA appealed the judgment.41  The Court of Appeals for the 
Western District of Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.42  Applying 
the court’s own “practical difficulty” analysis set forth in prior case law, the 
Western District held that the KC-BZA abused its discretion in denying the 
variance request because the variation was not substantial and would not 
 
 32. Id. § 88–810–170 (emphasis added). 
 33. Antioch Cmty. Church, 2016 WL 7209821, at *3. 
 34. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 9, at 28, 40. 
 35. Antioch Cmty. Church, 2016 WL 7209821, at * 2.  “Any person . . . aggrieved 
by any decision of the [BZA] . . . may present to the circuit court of the county . . . in 
which the property affected is located a petition, duly verified, setting forth that such 
decision is illegal, in whole or in part, specifying the grounds of the illegality.”  MO. 
REV. STAT. § 89.110 (2016). 
 36. Antioch Cmty. Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, No. 12CY–CV02727, 
2016 WL 8416849, at *3 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Apr. 7, 2016) (second alteration in original), 
rev’d, No. WD 79676, 2016 WL 7209821 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2016), rev’d, 543 
S.W.3d 28 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 37. Id. at *1. 
 38. Id. at *3, *5. 
 39. Id. at *6.  On appeal of a BZA’s decision to a circuit court, “[t]he court may 
reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or may modify the decision brought up for review.”  
MO. REV. STAT. § 89.110 (2016). 
 40. Antioch Cmty. Church, 2016 WL 8416849, at *6. 
 41. Antioch Cmty. Church, 2016 WL 7209821, at *1. 
 42. Id. at *1. 
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change the neighborhood’s character.43  The Western District further held there 
was no feasible alternative for the Church.44  The Supreme Court of Missouri 
granted transfer.45  Like the lower courts, it held that the KC-BZA did have the 
authority to grant the variance; however, the Supreme Court of Missouri af-
firmed the KC-BZA’s original denial of the variance because the Church failed 
to show “practical difficulties” in operating without the variance.46 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part will explore the fundamentals of zoning and variances.  Follow-
ing an introduction to the history of zoning and the legal framework for zoning 
in Missouri, this Part will address use and non-use variances and the implica-
tion of the variance type.  Next, this Part will discuss the review process for 
variances.  Finally, the application of zoning to places of worship will briefly 
be addressed. 
A. Zoning 
Comprehensive zoning laws emerged in the United States in the early 
1900s as a response to the problems associated with increasing population den-
sity.47  Zoning allows a local government to create districts within its jurisdic-
tion and define permissible land uses within those districts.48  Zoning purport-
edly serves many purposes, including the preservation of property values, the 
protection of the character and aesthetics of an area, and the control of traffic.49  
Zoning laws and regulations find justification through their relation to the po-
lice power – the state’s inherent ability to make laws for the promotion of “pub-
lic health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”50 
 
 43. Id. at *4.  The Western District did not address the constitutional issue because, 
by affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court of Clay County, there was no need to.  
See id. 
 44. Id. at *4. 
 45. Antioch Cmty. Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 543 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Mo. 
2018) (en banc). 
 46. Id. at 36, 41. 
 47. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386–87 (1926). 
 48. Matthew v. Smith, 707 S.W.2d 411, 412–13 (Mo. 1986) (en banc). 
 49. JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE 
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 49–54 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing the 
purposes of zoning). 
 50. Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387, 395.  Village of Euclid upheld the constitu-
tionality of excluding “business and trade of every sort,” id. at 390, from residential 
districts by providing that  
 
the reasons [put forth in favor of the ordinance] are sufficiently cogent to pre-
clude us from saying, as it must be said before the ordinance can be declared 
unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, 
9
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Across the United States, enabling acts grant this police power authority 
to local governments.51  In 1925, the Missouri legislature passed its zoning 
enabling act.52  Section 1 delineated the purpose of the act: 
[P]romoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the com-
munity, the legislative body of all incorporated cities, towns and vil-
lages is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict the height, number 
of stories, and size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of 
lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other open 
spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of buildings, 
structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes.53 
The act elaborated on the formation of districts, the purpose of the regu-
lations, the powers and limitations of the legislative body in the city, the pro-
cess for revising restrictions and boundaries, and the powers and duties of a 
zoning commission and a board of zoning adjustment (“BZA”).54  Today, 
chapter 89 of the Missouri Revised Statutes contains the modern iteration of 
these provisions.55 
A city’s legislative body has the power to “provide for the manner in 
which such regulations and restrictions and the boundaries of such districts 
shall be determined, established, and enforced, and from time to time amended, 
supplemented, or changed.”56  The zoning commission has the responsibility 
of recommending zoning boundaries and regulations.57  A BZA has the power 
 
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare. 
   
Id. at 395. 
 51. Stuart Meck, Model Planning and Zoning Enabling Legislation: A Short His-
tory, in 1 MODERNIZING STATE PLANNING STATUTES 1, 1 (1996). 
 52. Wells, supra note 15, at 19.  Missouri’s statute follows the lead of a 1920 New 
York statute that multiple jurisdictions copied in part prior to the United States Depart-
ment of Commerce’s Standard Zoning Act.  Matthew, 707 S.W.2d at 414.  Missouri 
also has a constitutional home rule provision, James E. Westbrook, Municipal Home 
Rule: An Evaluation of the Missouri Experience, 33 MO. L. REV. 45, 45–46 (1968), and 
Kansas City adopted its own charter in 1889, id. at 45 n.5. 
 
Any city which adopts or has adopted a charter for its own government, shall 
have all powers which the general assembly of the state of Missouri has author-
ity to confer upon any city, provided such powers are consistent with the con-
stitution of this state and are not limited or denied either by the charter so 
adopted or by statute. 
 
MO. CONST. art. VI, § 19(a). 
 53. Zoning Act, 1925 Mo. Sess. L. 307, 308. 
 54. Id. at 307–14. 
 55. See generally MO. REV. STAT. ch. 89 (2016). 
 56. Id. § 89.050. 
 57. Id. § 89.070. 
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to “hear and decide appeals” of any administrative decision pertaining to zon-
ing.58  The BZA has the power, when considering an appeal, “where there are 
practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship in the way of carrying out the 
strict letter of such ordinance, to vary or modify the application of any of the 
regulations or provisions of such ordinance . . . .”59  This power is exercised 
“so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed, public safety and welfare 
[shall be] secured and substantial justice [shall be] done.”60  The next Section 
addresses the power to vary the provisions of zoning ordinances. 
B. Zoning Variances 
Variances allow flexibility when zoning divisions create “inevitable hard-
ship situations” because of the unique characteristics of a piece of land.61  Due 
to its broad scale, the effect of a zoning ordinance cannot be anticipated on 
each parcel of land; to avoid legislation or litigation, a landowner may seek a 
variance – an administrative remedy – from the BZA.62  The Supreme Court 
of Missouri has explained that “[a] variance is in the nature of a waiver of the 
strict letter of the zoning law upon substantial compliance with it and without 
sacrificing its spirit and purpose.”63 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. § 89.090.1(3) (emphasis added). 
 60. Id. (“The [BZA] shall have the following powers: . . . In passing upon ap-
peals, where there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship in the way of car-
rying out the strict letter of such ordinance, to vary or modify the application of any 
of the regulations or provisions of such ordinance relating to the construction or alter-
ation of buildings or structures or the use of land so that the spirit of the ordinance 
shall be observed, public safety and welfare secured and substantial justice done, pro-
vided that, in any city with a population of three hundred fifty thousand or more in-
habitants which is located in more than one county, the board of adjustment shall not 
have the power to vary or modify any ordinance relating to the use of land.”).  Note 
that, based on population, the ending clause of this statute – the portion pertaining to 
“any city with a population of three hundred fifty thousand or more inhabitants which 
is located in more than one county” – applies only to Kansas City, which is in Clay 
County and Jackson County.  See Population Estimates for Missouri and Across the 
U.S., MO. CENSUS DATA CTR., http://sas.mcdc.missouri.edu/trends/estimates.html (se-
lect Curmoests.xlsx) (last visited Oct. 19, 2018) (Excel file with latest Missouri esti-
mates). 
 61. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 49, at 150. 
 62. STEWART E. STERK ET AL., LAND USE REGULATION 28–29 (2d ed. 2016). 
 63. Rosedale–Skinker Imp. Ass’n v. Bd. of Adjustment, 425 S.W.2d 929, 937 
(Mo. 1968) (en banc).  The opinion of the Supreme Court of Missouri continues – in a 
line that cannot be glossed over in the case at hand, “This is not a new concept.  Many 
years ago it was said that we should be ministers ‘not of the letter, but of the spirit: for 
the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.”  Id. (quoting 2 Corinthians 3:6). 
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Variances can serve as an “escape hatch” or “safety valve” where adher-
ence to the zoning scheme would create a unique hardship for a landowner.64  
For example, a uniquely shaped parcel may require a variance to support the 
construction of a structure that would be at odds with a setback requirement 
that a building be offset so many feet from all property boundary lines.  Grant-
ing a variance recognizes that “relief is necessary because of the unique char-
acter of the property,” as opposed to some circumstance unique to the land-
owner.65  However, the process to obtain a variance confines the ability to grant 
a variance to situations where it will not hurt “the preservation of the plan.”66  
The granting of a variance is a serious measure because variances are perpetual: 
They “[r]un with the land and are not personal to the owner.”67 
In the absence of a variance, the owner of a piece of land is left with less 
appealing alternatives.  Of course, there is always the option to forgo whatever 
improvement or change in use the landowner desires.  A more realistic option 
would be to pursue a zoning amendment –  a change to the restrictions within 
a zoning district or to the zoning map – but this method involves much more 
than the administrative variance process.68  Rezoning is a responsibility of the 
legislative body in a city, and the process introduces the possibility of increased 
involvement of neighbors.69  Furthermore, any rezoning still must not be “an 
unlawful departure from the comprehensive plan.”70  If a rezoning occurs, by 
definition, the area becomes subject to the regulations and restrictions of the 
new zoning designation – a more risky alternative for adjacent landowners 
compared to a non-use variance. 
In land use planning, there are generally two broad categories of vari-
ances: use variances and non-use variances.71  A use variance, when granted 
by a BZA, permits a use of property that would not otherwise be allowed within 
 
 64. Matthew v. Smith, 707 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (quoting City 
& Borough of Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626, 633 (Alaska 1979)). 
 65. Id. at 415. 
 66. Id. at 416. 
 67. Ogawa v. City of Des Peres, 745 S.W.2d 238, 245 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). 
 68. STERK ET AL., supra note 62, at 75–76. 
 69. See MO. REV. STAT. § 89.060 (2016) (“In case, however, of a protest . . . by 
the owners of thirty percent or more, either of the areas of the land (exclusive of streets 
and alleys) included in such proposed change or within an area determined by lines 
drawn parallel to and one hundred and eighty-five feet distant from the boundaries of 
the district proposed to be changed, such amendment shall not become effective except 
by the favorable vote of two-thirds of all the members of the legislative body of such 
municipality.” (emphasis added)). 
 70. Strandberg v. Kan. City, 415 S.W.2d 737, 747 (Mo. 1967).  Spot zoning, “an 
amendment to the municipal zoning law reclassifying one or more lots or parcels of 
land for a use out of harmony with the classification of the surrounding areas and with-
out regard to the public welfare” is not allowed.  Id. at 746. 
 71. Matthew, 707 S.W.2d at 413.  Non-use variances are commonly referred to as 
area variances.  Id. 
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its given zoning district.72  “A non[-]use variance authorizes deviations from 
restrictions which relate to a permitted use.”73  Examples of non-use variances 
include “variances of bulk restrictions, of area, height, density, setback, side 
line restrictions, and restrictions covering miscellaneous subjects.”74  Before 
the 1986 Supreme Court of Missouri’s opinion in Matthew v. Smith,75 it was 
unclear whether use variances were even permitted in Missouri.76  Previous 
case law seemed to indirectly hold that use variances were disallowed because 
they impermissibly delegated power to an administrative body.77  Matthew 
held that a BZA’s grant of a use variance under proper circumstances was not 
an unconstitutional delegation of power to a BZA.78 
C. The Implication of Variance Type 
Whether a variance’s classification counts as a use or non-use variance 
controls the standard by which the variance is granted.79  For a BZA to grant a 
use variance, the “applicant must demonstrate, inter alia, unnecessary hard-
ship.”80  Approval of a non-use variance requires, “inter alia, the existence of 
conditions slightly less rigorous than unnecessary hardship.”81  Thus, Missouri 
case law requires what amounts to a showing of “practical difficulties” to grant 
a non-use variance.82  “No all-inclusive definition” exists of what “practical 
difficulty” or “unnecessary hardship” will definitively result in the granting of 
a variance.83  The decision of whether to grant or deny a variance is highly 
context-specific and turns “on the facts and circumstances of each case,”84 but 
 
 72. Id. (citing 3 A. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning § 38.01 (1979)).  
“Allowing a retail store to establish in a residential zoning district would be an exam-
ple” of a use variance.  Board of Adjustment Appeals, MD. HEIGHTS, http://www.mar-
ylandheights.com/departments/community-development/development-zoning-pro-
cess/board-of-adjustment-appeals (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).  There are not any Mis-
souri appellate opinions following Matthew where a use variance was granted. 
 73. Matthew, 707 S.W.2d at 413 (citing 3 A. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and 
Planning § 38.01 (1979)). 
 74. Id. (citing 3 A. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning § 38.01 (1979)). 
 75. 707 S.W.2d 411. 
 76. See id. at 415–16. 
 77. Id. at 416–18. 
 78. Id. at 418–19.  This concurs with the plain language of the zoning statute.  Id. 
at 414; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 89.090.1(3) (2016) (“The board of adjustment shall 
have the following powers . . . to vary or modify the application of any of the regula-
tions or provisions of such ordinance relating to . . . the use of land . . . .”).  Of course, 
as discussed supra note 60, Kansas City does not allow its BZA to make use variances. 
 79. Matthew, 707 S.W.2d at 416. 
 80. Id. (italics omitted). 
 81. Id. (italics omitted). 
 82. Id. at 416 n.6. 
 83. Rosedale–Skinker Imp. Ass’n v. Bd. of Adjustment, 425 S.W.2d 929, 933 
(Mo. 1968) (en banc). 
 84. Id. at 936. 
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“[t]he general rule is that the authority to grant a variance should be exercised 
sparingly and only under exceptional circumstances.”85 
Although the legislative body of a local government may provide the 
specifications for regulations and restrictions within zoning districts,86 the 
standards for “unnecessary hardship” or “practical difficulty” are derived from 
Missouri’s common law.87  The Supreme Court of Missouri has recognized the 
“classic definition of unnecessary hardship” – the BZA must find (1) that, in 
the absence of the variance, the land “cannot yield a reasonable return”; (2) that 
the necessity of the variance is due to “unique circumstances”; and (3) that 
granting the variance will not change the “essential character” of the area.88  
The difficulty of satisfying the elements of “unnecessary hardship” indicates 
that use variances should be granted only in rare circumstances.  After all, these 
variances would truly affect the basic nature of a comprehensive zoning plan.89 
Unlike the relatively straightforward three-element test for unnecessary 
hardship in use variance cases, there is no definite framework for showing prac-
tical difficulties in non-use variance cases; however, case law has recognized 
several factors.90  According to Highland Homes Association v. Board of Ad-
justment,91 these include: (1) the extent of the variance from the zoning re-
quirements; (2) the impact of the variance on the neighborhood; (3) a feasible 
alternative other than the variance; and (4) “whether, in light of the manner in 
which the difficulty arose and considering all relevant factors, the interests of 
justice will be served by granting the variance.”92  Economic hardship may also 
be a consideration in granting a non-use variance.93 
 
 85. Matthew, 707 S.W.2d at 413. 
 86. MO. REV. STAT. § 89.050 (2016). 
 87. Matthew, 707 S.W.2d at 415–16. 
 88. Id. at 416–17 (quoting Otto v. Steinhilber, 24 N.E.2d 851, 853 (N.Y. 1939)).  
The “reasonable return” element involves “depriv[ation] of all beneficial use of the 
property under any of the permitted uses” and should be shown by “actual proof, often 
in the form of dollars and cent evidence.”  Id. at 417. 
 89. Id. at 416 (“[A]n area variance is a relaxation of one or more incidental limi-
tations to a permitted use and does not alter the character of the district as much as a 
use not permitted by the ordinance.”). 
 90. See, e.g., Highlands Homes Ass’n v. Bd. of Adjustment, 306 S.W.3d 561, 565–
68 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009), abrogated by Antioch Cmty. Church v. Bd. of Adjustment, 
543 S.W.3d 28 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 91. 306 S.W.3d 561. 
 92. Id. at 566.  These factors appear to be first enumerated in Missouri in Slate v. 
Boone County Board of Adjustment.  810 S.W.2d 361, 364 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (citing 
Wachsberger v. Michalis, 191 N.Y.S.2d 621, 624 (1959), aff’d, 18 A.D.2d 921 (N.Y. 
1963)). 
 93. State ex rel. Holly Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 771 S.W.2d 949, 
951–52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989), abrogated by Antioch Cmty. Church, 543 S.W.3d 28. 
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D. Variance Review and Decision-Making 
In Kansas City, the BZA has the responsibility to “hear and decide all 
matters referred to it or upon which it is required to pass under [the] zoning and 
development code.”94  When the KC-BZA addresses zoning variances, it must 
do so with the intent of “address[ing] unnecessary hardships or practical diffi-
culties resulting from strict application of zoning-related standards.”95  The 
KC-BZA has the discretion to approve variances “when they find substantial 
evidence in the official record that” three review criteria exist.96  Those criteria 
are as follows: 
88-565-06-A. strict application of one or more standards or require-
ments of this zoning and development code would result in unnecessary 
hardships or practical difficulties for the subject property and that such 
unnecessary hardships or practical difficulties are not generally appli-
cable to other property in the same zoning district; 
88-565-06-B. the zoning variance is generally consistent with all rele-
vant purposes and intents of this zoning and development code; and 
88-565-06-C. the zoning variance will result in substantial justice being 
done, considering both the public benefits intended to be secured by this 
zoning and development code and the individual hardships or practical 
difficulties that will be suffered if the zoning variance request is de-
nied.97 
Five factors are set out that the KC-BZA “must also consider” in the eval-
uation of variances.98  These include: (1) whether the need for the variance was 
caused by the requesting party; (2) whether granting the variance would confer 
an advantage to the requesting party that others in the district lack; (3) whether 
the variance is of the least intrusive nature for the relief; (4) whether granting 
the variance would invade the rights of others affected; and (5) whether the 
request for the variance is a consequence of an intentional violation of the zon-
ing.99 
When a Missouri court reviews the decisions of a BZA, the court decides 
“whether the ruling is authorized by law and is supported by competent and 
 
 94. KANSAS CITY, MO., ZONING AND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 88–605–01–B 
(2012).  The KC-BZA is comprised of five members appointed by the mayor with the 
advice and consent of the city council.  Id. § 88–605–01–A.1, 4.  Qualification for 
membership consists of residency within the city.  Id. § 88–605–01–A.1. 
 95. Id. § 88–565–01. 
 96. Id. § 88–565–06. 
 97. Id. § 88–565–06–A–C. 
 98. Id. § 88–565–07. 
 99. Id. § 88–565–07–A–E. 
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substantial evidence upon the whole record.”100  This judicial review standard 
comes from the Missouri Constitution.101  “[A]ppellate court[s] must view the 
evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
decision.”102  Some Missouri appellate decisions specify that the standard is 
different for use and non-use variances.103  These opinions state that non-use 
variances are reviewed only for abuse of discretion.104  Upon an appeal of a 
trial court judgement, “the findings and conclusions of the BZA and not the 
trial court” are reviewed.105  An appellate court will independently review any 
question of law.106 
E. Zoning and Places of Worship107 
Local governments have the power to regulate churches through zoning 
under their police power.108  The Supreme Court of Missouri has held that the 
state’s zoning enabling act could not be used to prohibit churches in residential 
districts.109  However, “‘municipalities may use their regulatory powers over 
 
 100. Rosedale–Skinker Imp. Ass’n v. Bd. of Adjustment, 425 S.W.2d 929, 936 
(Mo. 1968) (en banc). 
 101. MO. CONST. art. V, § 18 (“All final decisions, findings, rules and orders on any 
administrative officer or body existing under the constitution or by law, which are ju-
dicial or quasi–judicial and affect private rights, shall be subject to direct review by the 
courts as provided by law; and such review shall include the determination whether the 
same are authorized by law, and in cases in which a hearing is required by law, whether 
the same are supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole rec-
ord.”); Matthew v. Smith, 707 S.W.2d 411, 417 n.8 (Mo. 1986) (en banc). 
 102. State ex rel. Teefey v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 24 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Mo. 
2000) (en banc). 
 103. Highlands Homes Ass’n v. Bd. of Adjustment, 306 S.W.3d 561, 565 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2009), abrogated by Antioch Cmty. Church v. Bd. of Adjustment, 543 S.W.3d 28 
(Mo. 2018) (en banc); Baumer v. City of Jennings, 247 S.W.3d 105, 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2008); State ex rel. Branum v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 85 S.W.3d 35, 39 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2002), abrogated by Antioch Cmty. Church, 543 S.W.3d 28. 
 104. E.g., Highlands Homes Ass’n, 306 S.W.3d at 565.  “‘The determination of 
whether practical difficulties exist is a factual matter,’ which is why the abuse of dis-
cretion standard is used.”  Id. (citing Baumer, 247 S.W.3d at 113). 
 105. Teefey, 24 S.W.3d at 684. 
 106. Id. 
 107. As discussed infra Section IV.C, the Supreme Court of Missouri rather quickly 
pierced holes through the Church’s First Amendment argument.  As the claim was dis-
missed for procedural reasons, this Note will not take the opportunity to comment ex-
tensively on the substance of this argument.   
 108. Congregation Temple Isr. v. City of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451, 456 (Mo. 
1959) (giving the examples of regulation related to the “safety of boilers, smokestacks 
and similar facilities . . . , sanitation . . . , manner and type of construction for fire 
protection[,] . . . off-street parking facilities, sewage disposal and other matters related 
to the public health, safety and welfare”). 
 109. Id. at 454 (“Certainly churches do not come within the classification of trade, 
industry, residence or other similar purposes.”). 
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churches solely for the purposes of promoting health, safety, morals, or the 
general welfare of the community.’”110   Determining when a regulation crosses 
the line and infringes on the free exercise of religion requires a case-by-case 
analysis.111 
In the 2015 United States Supreme Court decision, Reed v. Town of Gil-
bert,112 the Court discussed how “content-neutral options” may be used in a 
city’s sign ordinance “to resolve problems with safety and aesthetics.”113  
Standards that are content-neutral include “[r]ules distinguishing between the 
placement of signs on commercial and residential property” and “[r]ules dis-
tinguishing between signs with fixed messages and electronic signs with mes-
sages that change.”114  These content-neutral options give municipalities the 
ability to “enact and enforce reasonable sign regulations.”115 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the KC-BZA 
improperly determined that it lacked the authority to grant the variance.116  The 
court further found that the decision of the KC-BZA to deny the variance based 
on an inadequate showing of practical difficulties should be affirmed.117  Fi-
nally, the court addressed the Church’s First Amendment claim, holding that it 
must be dismissed because it was not preserved.118  The rationales underpin-
ning each of these holdings will be addressed in turn. 
A. The KC-BZA Could Grant the Variance 
The Supreme Court of Missouri, in accord with the trial court and the 
Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri, held that the KC-BZA 
erred in determining that it lacked the authority to grant the variance.119  The 
KC-BZA’s argument proceeded as follows: (1) the addition of the digital dis-
play to the monument sign changed the sign type, i.e., that it was now a digital 
sign; (2) the ordinance did not allow the KC-BZA to grant variances to sign 
 
 110. St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Ellisville, 122 S.W.3d 635, 
643 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Vill. Lutheran Church v. City 
of Ladue, 997 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)). 
 111. Id. at 644. 
 112. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
 113. Id. at 2232.  However, an ordinance that involves content-based restrictions 
will require analysis under strict scrutiny – a compelling governmental interest that is 
narrowly tailored. 
 114. Id. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Antioch Cmty. Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 543 S.W.3d 28, 31 (Mo. 
2018) (en banc). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 42–43. 
 119. Id. at 31. 
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types; thus, (3) the KC-BZA lacked the authority to give a variance to allow a 
digital display on a monument sign.120 
The court interpreted the language of the ordinance differently and agreed 
with the Church’s argument that the sign remained a monument sign, despite 
the digital portion.121  There is no requirement that a sign cannot be more than 
one type.122  The court analyzed other sections of the Code to find examples of 
overlapping sign types.123  One section specifically permitted “[e]lectronic, 
digital, or motorized monument signs” in non-residential districts.124  Thus, the 
court reasoned that the Church’s monument sign remained a monument sign – 
now with a digital display.125  Because there was no request for a change to 
sign type, the KC-BZA had the authority to grant the variance.126 
B. The KC-BZA’s Decision to Deny the Variance Was Affirmed 
The Supreme Court of Missouri ultimately held that the Church failed to 
satisfy “its burden of establishing the existence of a practical difficulty absent 
the grant of a variance for its digital sign,” affirming the KC-BZA’s denial of 
the variance in that regard.127  To reach this conclusion, the court first clarified 
the standard of review.128  Citing article V, section 18 of the Missouri Consti-
tution, the court overruled prior variance cases at the intermediate appellate 
level to the extent that they differentiated the standard of review in use and 
non-use variance cases.129  By mandate of the Missouri Constitution, the stand-
ard of review for any variance case – because it entails judicial review of an 
agency decision involving a hearing – is “whether the [decision is] authorized 
by law . . . and supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the 
whole record.”130  In a footnote to the opinion, the court acknowledged that the 
“competent and substantial evidence” standard is “semantically awkward” – in 
a variance case, a court will be looking at “whether the [BZA] properly found 
the applicant did not present sufficient evidence to support the grant of a vari-
ance.”131 
Having established the standard of review, the court next determined 
whether the KC-BZA’s decision to deny the variance complied with that stand-
ard.132  After setting out the differences between use and non-use variance from 
 
 120. Id. at 35. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 35–36. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 36. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 42. 
 128. Id. at 33. 
 129. Id. at 34. 
 130. Id. at 33–34 (first alteration in original). 
 131. Id. at 33 n.4 (alteration in original).  
 132. Id. at 35–38. 
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Matthew, the seminal Missouri variance case, the court proceeded to analyze 
the requested variance as a non-use variance – one that could only be granted 
upon a showing of practical difficulties.133  This practical difficulty test is nec-
essarily ill-defined.134  Although the practical difficulty standard involves an 
“inherently fact-specific” analysis that is “committed to the discretion of the 
[BZA],” the court recognized three “guiding principles” from Rosedale-
Skinker to aid the analysis: (1) that granting variances should be an infrequent 
occurrence and only be given if in harmony with the zoning plan; (2) that judi-
cial review should be limited to whether the BZA’s decision is “authorized by 
law” and “supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole 
record;” and (3) that, unless specified otherwise in the local ordinance, the state 
statute allows a non-use variance to be granted beyond those issues inherent in 
the topography of a tract of land, as some previous cases stated.135 
The court clarified that “to ensure it is practical difficulties with the zon-
ing that cause the need for a variance, later non-use cases have followed Mat-
thew’s requirement for use variances that the applicant show ‘relief is neces-
sary because of the unique character of the property rather than for personal 
considerations.’”136  The court referenced Highland Homes for the proposition 
that the interpretation of that statement, distinct from the standard of a use var-
iance, “means the applicant seeks to use the property for a specific permitted 
use but cannot do so without conflicting with the zoning requirement as to 
which the applicant seeks a variance.”137  The court also cited the four factors 
to consider when showing practical difficulties in non-use variance cases, as 
set forth in Highland Homes.138 
These factors are just that – they are merely guidelines.139  Local ordi-
nances may impose greater requirements as long as they are not in conflict with 
 
 133. Id. at 37. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.  Rosedale-Skinker, a case decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri in 
1968, involved the St. Louis BZA’s grant of a height variance for a building expansion.  
Rosedale-Skinker Imp. Ass’n v. Bd. of Adjustment, 425 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Mo. 1968) 
(en banc).  When neighbors appealed that decision, in part by arguing that “no practical 
difficulty or unnecessary hardship was established by [the applicant] or found by the 
[St. Louis BZA],” id., the court found the BZA’s discretion supported, id. at 937.  The 
applicant showed the building to be a special purpose building – one containing tele-
phone exchange equipment – and the building needed the height variance to accommo-
date equipment.  Id. 
 136. Antioch Cmty. Church, 543 S.W.3d at 38 (emphasis added) (quoting Matthew 
v. Smith, 707 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Mo. 1986) (en banc)). 
 137. Id. at 38–39 (citing Highland Homes Ass’n v. Board of Adjustment, 306 
S.W.3d 561, 566 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009), abrogated by Antioch Cmty. Church, 543 
S.W.3d 28). 
 138. See id.; see also supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.  The court recog-
nizes that these are ultimately an import from Wachsberger – a case out of New York.  
Antioch Cmty. Church, 543 S.W.3d at 38–39 (quoting Highland Homes Ass’n, 306 
S.W.3d at 364). 
 139. Antioch Cmty. Church, 543 S.W.3d at 39. 
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chapter 89.140  Kansas City has done so in section 88-565-06 of the Code.141  
Citing Rosedale-Skinker, the court stated that “ultimately the question of 
whether practical difficulties have been shown ‘is a question of fact as to which 
the [KC-BZA] is accorded a discretion to be exercised within the guidelines of 
the zoning legislation.’”142  The court next analyzed whether the variance in 
Antioch “would meet the various criteria recognized in the cases” because the 
KC-BZA and the Church, according to the court, “[did] not claim applying the 
local ordinance change[d] the analysis.”143 
After setting out the Highland Homes framework, the court dismissed the 
Church’s claimed practical difficulties.144  The Church argued practical diffi-
culties based on the following circumstances: (1) a difficulty modifying the 
message of the old sign, (2) the desire for passing motorists to more easily see 
the sign’s message, and (3) the fact that the Church had spent the large sum of 
money to add the digital display because of a unique set of circumstances.145  
The court explained that none of these demonstrated the Church would experi-
ence practical difficulties in the absence of a variance.146  The court reiterated 
that the test was whether, “as a practical matter[,] the property cannot be used 
for a [specific] permitted use without coming into conflict with certain of the 
ordinance’s restrictions.”147  Because the circumstances cited by the Church 
did not render conflict with the ordinance’s restrictions inevitable, the court 
classified these circumstances as mere preferences and conveniences in-
stead.148 
C. The First Amendment Claim 
The Church, in its First Amendment claim, asserted that the zoning code 
prohibiting the digital display on monument signs in residential zones favored 
commercial speech over non-commercial speech.149  The court rejected this 
claim with much greater ease than the application of the practical difficulty 
standard.  It held that the Church did not preserve this claim – Kansas City, the 
proper defendant for this claim, was not added as a defendant before the trial 
court entered judgment.150  The court further declined to remand for the con-
stitutional issue because “[a] constitutional claim must be raised in the first 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. (quoting Rosedale-Skinker Imp. Ass’n v. Bd. of Adjustment, 425 S.W.2d 
929, 933 (Mo. 1968) (en banc)). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 40. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 41 (alteration in original) (quoting Slate v. Boone Cty Bd. of Adjustment, 
810 S.W.2d 361, 364 (Mo. 1991)). 
 148. Id. at 40. 
 149. Id. at 42. 
 150. Id. 
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instance and cannot be changed on appeal.”151  Ultimately, the court held that 
if the Church had proved practical difficulties for the variance, it could have 
been granted a variance; the ordinance was not unconstitutional merely because 
the Church could not meet its burden.152 
V. COMMENT 
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the KC-BZA had the authority 
to grant the variance, but it affirmed the KC-BZA’s decision to deny the vari-
ance because the Church did not establish practical difficulties.153  Because the 
authority of the KC-BZA to grant the variance merely turns on the overlapping 
definitions of sign types in the Code, the authority of the KC-BZA to grant the 
variance will not be further addressed.  Likewise, because the First Amendment 
issue was dismissed as not preserved, it, too, will not be discussed.  Rather, this 
Part argues: (A) that the Supreme Court of Missouri missed the mark in nar-
rowly defining a practical difficulty test; (B) that the “competent and substan-
tial” standard of review, as presented in the case, downplays the potential that 
a BZA’s decision may still be contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evi-
dence; (C) that, in the review of all variance cases, the local ordinance, rather 
than some statewide standard, should be the guide; and (D) that, in Antioch, the 
KC-BZA did not properly consider the Church’s argument because of its reli-
ance on its lack of authority to grant the variance.  Section E concludes this 
Part by suggesting a more sensible method for addressing signs with institu-
tional uses. 
A. Revisiting “Practical Difficulties” 
The Supreme Court of Missouri unnecessarily grafted a component from 
the appropriately more difficult use variance standard onto the practical diffi-
culties standard for non-use variances.  That component is the requirement that 
“relief is necessary because of the unique character of the property rather than 
 
 151. Id. at 43.  This outcome is disappointing; the First Amendment issue is not 
considered due to the timing of the supplemental petition in the trial court.  Application 
of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, in the first instance, could 
have been a good argument.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2018) (“No government 
shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious as-
sembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institu-
tion.”); id. § 2000cc(b)(3)(B) (“No government shall impose or implement a land use 
regulation that . . .  unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institutions, or structures 
within a jurisdiction.”). 
 152. Antioch Cmty. Church, 543 S.W.3d at 43. 
 153. Id. at 43. 
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for personal considerations.”154  The court acknowledged that cases in Mis-
souri involving non-use variances subsequent to Matthew took this path.155  
The court could and should have taken the opportunity to recognize that portion 
of the use variance analysis as unduly burdensome in the context of a non-use 
variance.  The outcome is that non-use variances can only be granted when “the 
applicant seeks to use the property for a specific permitted use but cannot do 
so without conflicting with the zoning requirement as to which the applicant 
seeks a variance.”156  This amounts to a strict test. 
As an initial matter, taken literally, that simply cannot be the proper anal-
ysis.  Take a variety of typical non-use variances – variances for bulk re-
strictions or for area, height, density, setback, or sideline restrictions – and plug 
them into that formula along with a zoning category to see the folly in this 
proposition.  Consider an existing grocery store that adds a restaurant within 
its interior.  It seeks a variance to the sign ordinance allowing wall signage that 
exceeds the maximum square feet permitted because the owner would like to 
place a small sign advertising the restaurant on the store’s exterior in addition 
to the existing signage. 157  According to Antioch, the store could not add the 
sign.  This is because, per Antioch’s analysis, the property could still be used 
for a specific permitted use – a store/restaurant or commercial use – without 
the variance, and therefore, the store would be unable to demonstrate practical 
difficulties. 
Not only would this outcome be highly unsatisfying from the perspective 
of any landowner who may seek a variance to a local ordinance, but it also 
effectively destroys the safety-valve aspects of non-use variances and pro-
scribes the BZA from granting non-use variances.  And, because this is a Su-
preme Court of Missouri opinion, these unreasonable effects cascade down 
onto all courts reviewing appeals from local BZAs across Missouri.  Especially 
as zoning ordinances relate to signs, it seems quite possible that most prospec-
tive sign variances would be personal in nature rather than resulting from the 
unique nature of the property involved.  More importantly, beyond the appli-
cation of sign variances, this outcome has the potential to remove the ability of 
a local BZA to grant a relatively minor variance to an applicant – resulting in 
stalled development and an overall hindrance to the alienability of commercial 
property within a jurisdiction. 
To resolve this dilemma, as a starting point, Missouri’s statute addressing 
the power of a BZA should be analyzed.  The BZA has the power, 
 
 154. Id. at 36 (quoting Matthew v. Smith, 707 S.W.2d 411, 415–16 (Mo. 1986) (en 
banc)). 
 155. See id. at 38.  Note that these cases were in the intermediate appellate courts, 
not the Supreme Court of Missouri.  
 156. Id. at 38. 
 157. Cf. Meeting Minutes: Board of Adjustment, CITY OF COLUMBIA, MO. (Feb. 14, 
2017), 
https://www.como.gov/CMS/granicus/downloadfile.php?type=minutes&id=590 (dis-
cussing and granting a variance for a Hy-Vee Market Grille logo to the wall of the 
store). 
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[i]n passing upon appeals, where there are practical difficulties or un-
necessary hardship in the way of carrying out the strict letter of such 
ordinance, to vary or modify the application of any of the regulations or 
provisions of such ordinance relating to the construction or alteration of 
buildings or structures or the use of land so that the spirit of the ordi-
nance shall be observed, public safety and welfare secured and substan-
tial justice done . . . .158 
As recognized throughout land use doctrine, “practical difficulties” and 
“unnecessary hardship” are intentionally vague.  The assumption is that local 
government will clarify the standards and that those exercising the power as 
part of a BZA will have the flexibility to go beyond a rigid set of elements in 
deciding whether an applicant has demonstrated a need for a variance.  “Prac-
tical difficulty” should be left as a more workable standard, subject only to 
additional requirements imposed by the local jurisdiction whose legislative 
body can easily rectify problems encountered with any standards set forth in 
the ordinance. 
The court correctly recognized that the Church “finds a digital display 
preferable and more convenient,” but then it stated that the Church “[did] not 
show practical difficulty in carrying out the Church’s use of the property as a 
church.”159  Perhaps a more elegant, and useful, method would be to consider 
zoning variances on a spectrum ranging from the landowner’s desire to incon-
venience to practical difficulty. 
In practice, a BZA, following general guidelines set forth in the local zon-
ing ordinance instead of a bright-line rule, would assess the entirety of the ap-
plicant’s situation alongside the overarching purpose of the zoning ordinance.  
A desire would not rise to the level of warranting a variance – it would be too 
personal to the applicant and granting a variance based on this would result in 
the dissolution of the zoning plan.  A practical difficulty, as it is understood in 
a general sense, would warrant a variance; this opposite end of the spectrum 
would recognize that zoning regulations need to be malleable to accommodate 
the “unique character of the property.”160  The middle ground would be left to 
the discretion of a BZA to act in its function to vary or modify the application 
of the ordinance “so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed, public 
safety and welfare secured and substantial justice done.”161  In reality, for non-
use variances, the standard must at least acknowledge that the circumstances 
relate somewhat to the property owner. 
 
 158. MO. REV. STAT. § 89.090.1(3) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 159. Antioch Cmty. Church, 543 S.W.3d at 40. 
 160. Id. at 41 (quoting Matthew v. Smith, 707 S.W.2d 411, 415–16 (Mo. 1986) (en 
banc)). 
 161. MO. REV. STAT. § 89.090.1(3). 
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B. The “Competent and Substantial Evidence” Standard of Review 
The Antioch decision settles the discrepancy between past cases about the 
appropriate standard of review in all variance cases in Missouri – it is to be the 
“competent and substantial evidence” standard.162  The standard “is met when 
the record supports the [BZA’s] determination the applicant failed to present 
evidence showing practical difficulties or other requirements for a variance.”163  
Unfortunately, as it appears in Antioch, this standard seemingly creates a black 
box for BZA decision-making.  With the burden of demonstrating practical 
difficulty placed on the applicant of a variance and the requirement that appel-
late review be limited to viewing the record “in a light most favorable to the 
decision,”164 the practical effect of such a standard is that it becomes extremely 
challenging for the BZA to ever be overturned. 
The court’s presentation of the competent and substantial evidence stand-
ard is incomplete.  The competent and substantial evidence standard “author-
ize[s] [the reviewing court] to decide whether such tribunal could have reason-
ably made its findings, and reached its result, upon consideration of all of the 
evidence before it; and to set aside decisions clearly contrary to the overwhelm-
ing weight of the evidence.”165  The Missouri statute discussing the procedure 
for how a BZA’s decision is reviewed even anticipates the possibility of a court 
taking additional evidence through testimony.166  Additionally, article V, sec-
tion 18 of the Missouri Constitution does not require the reviewing court to 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the determination by the ad-
ministrative agency.167  Granted, a court cannot view the evidence and simply 
insert its own judgment over that of the administrative agency.168 
Taken together, all of this suggests that a court’s goal should be to reach 
a reasonable decision without giving blind deference to the BZA.  Matthew 
specifies that “[a]lthough the circuit court does not exercise de novo review, 
 
 162. Antioch Cmty. Church, 543 S.W.3d at 33–34. 
 163. Id. at 34 n.4. 
 164. Id. at 34 (quoting State ex rel. Teefey v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 24 S.W.3d 
681, 684 (Mo. 2000)). 
 165. Wood v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 197 S.W.2d 647, 674 (Mo. 1946) (en banc); see 
also Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) 
(“This standard w[ill] not be met in the rare case when the award is contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence.”). 
 166. MO. REV. STAT. § 89.110. 
 167. See MO. CONST. art. V, § 18.  Likewise, section 89.110 does not specify this 
either.  See MO. REV. STAT. § 89.110.  However, the Supreme Court of Missouri noted 
in a prior case involving a BZA appeal that “[i]n determining whether substantial evi-
dence existed to support the BZA’s decision, an appellate court must view the evidence 
and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the decision.”  Teefey, 
24 S.W.3d at 684. 
 168. Wood, 197 S.W.2d at 649. 
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the statute nonetheless contemplates a meaningful review that may extend be-
yond the record before the [BZA].”169  Matthew also seems to suggest that 
written findings by the BZA would help clarify whether there was sufficient 
evidence.170  Written findings would have been enlightening in this case and 
could have demonstrated how the KC-BZA made its findings. 
In the application of the competent and substantial evidence standard as 
it applies to the KC-BZA and the Church, the Supreme Court of Missouri stated 
that “it was up to [the Church] to present competent and substantial evidence 
supporting a variance, and up to the [KC-]BZA to determine, in its discretion, 
whether that evidence supported a variance.”171  The court noted the KC-BZA 
did not have a burden to contradict evidence offered by applicants, including 
the Church.172  However, in the absence of written findings and under a mean-
ingful review, the court could have found that the KC-BZA’s decision was 
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence in Antioch. 
C. The Local Ordinance Should Be the Guide 
Determining whether practical difficulties exist that warrant the grant of 
a non-use variance should depend primarily on the text of the ordinance.  Case 
law that attempts to apply these standards complicates future precedent when 
the analysis is divorced from the local ordinance.  Antioch serves as an example 
of how none of the reviewing courts comprehensively analyzed the ordinance 
of Kansas City – the text that should have controlled the outcome.  Based on 
the Code, and with the ex-post-facto realization that the BZA had the authority 
to grant the variance, the Church had a strong argument for the grant of the 
variance. 
Although the Clay County Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals for the 
Western District of Missouri recognized the lack of a precise definition of prac-
tical difficulties, both turned immediately to the Highland Homes four-factor 
analysis.173  The review criteria174 and factors to be considered175 from the 
Kansas City ordinance were scarcely analyzed.  The Supreme Court of Mis-
souri fared better: It stated that the Highland Homes factors were helpful but 
that “local ordinances, such as Kansas City’s zoning code[,] ‘may further de-
 
 169. Matthew v. Smith, 707 S.W.2d 411, 417 n.8 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (emphasis 
added). 
 170. See id. 
 171. Antioch Cmty. Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 543 S.W.3d 28, 40 n.9 
(Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at *4; Antioch Cmty. Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, No. 12CY–
CV02727, 2016 WL 8416849, at *3 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Apr. 7, 2016), rev’d, No. WD 79676, 
2016 WL 7209821 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2016), rev’d, 543 S.W.3d 28. 
 174. See KANSAS CITY, MO., ZONING AND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 88–565–06 
(2012). 
 175. Id. § 88–565–07. 
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fine the power of the [BZA] to grant a variance,’” absent conflict with the stat-
utory criteria.176  It then set out the review criteria from section 88-565-06;177 
however, it did not venture into the factors to be considered that are present in 
the ordinance in section 88-565-07.  That shortcoming, as developed next, fa-
tally impacted the analysis. 
Section 88-565-06A contains the reference to practical difficulties in the 
Code: “Zoning variances may be approved by the [KC-BZA] when they find 
substantial evidence . . . [that a] strict application of one or more standards or 
requirements of [the Code] would result in unnecessary hardships or practical 
difficulties . . . .”178  Considering the fact that Kansas City cannot grant use 
variances, per the state statute,179 the review criteria in section 55-565-06 and 
the factors that must be considered in section 88-565-07 of the Code suggest 
that those factors should constitute the entirety of the practical difficulty test 
for  Kansas City.  Table 1 compares these factors and criteria to the Highland 


























 176. Antioch Cmty. Church, 543 S.W.3d at 39 (quoting Matthew v. Smith, 707 
S.W.2d 411, 415 (Mo. 1986) (en banc)). 
 177. Id. (quoting KANSAS CITY, MO., ZONING AND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 88–565–
06). 
 178. KANSAS CITY, MO., ZONING AND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 88–565–06–A. 
 179. See supra note 60. 
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Ordinance’s Review Criteria and Factors180 Four Factors from 
Highland Homes181 
88-565-06-A. strict application of one or more 
standards or requirements of this zoning and 
development code would result in unnecessary 
hardships or practical difficulties for the sub-
ject property and that such unnecessary hard-
ships or practical difficulties are not generally 
applicable to other property in the same zon-
ing district 
N/A (this is a general 
statement of the analysis 
to be used) 
88-565-06-B. the zoning variance is generally 
consistent with all relevant purposes and in-
tents of this zoning and development code . . . 
(1) how substantial the re-
quested variance is 
88-565-06-C. the zoning variance will result 
in substantial justice being done, considering 
both the public benefits intended to be secured 
by this zoning and development code and the 
individual hardships or practical difficulties 
that will be suffered if the zoning variance re-
quest is denied 
(4) whether, in light of the 
manner in which the diffi-
culty arose and consider-
ing all relevant factors, 
the interests of justice will 
be served by granting the 
variance 
88-565-07-A. whether the undue hardship or 
practical difficulties are the result of the ac-
tions of the property owner or applicant, their 
agent, employee, or contractor 
N/A 
88-565-07-B. whether granting the requested 
zoning variance will result in advantages or 
special privileges to the applicant or property 
owner that this zoning and development code 
denies to other land, structures, or uses in the 
same district 
N/A 
88-565-07-C. whether the requested zoning 
variance is the minimum zoning variance nec-
essary to provide relief 
(3) whether the difficulty 
can be obviated by some 
method, feasible for the 
applicant to pursue, other 
than a variance 
 
 180. All of the factors and criteria in this column are quoted verbatim from KANSAS 
CITY, MO., ZONING AND DEVELOPMENT CODE §§ 88–565–06, 88–565–07. 
 181. All of the factors and criteria in this column which begin with a number are 
quoted verbatim from Highlands Homes Ass’n v. Bd. of Adjustment, 306 S.W.3d 561, 
566 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009), abrogated by Antioch Cmty. Church, 543 S.W.3d 28. 
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88-565-07-D. whether the zoning variance, if 
allowed, will substantially interfere with or in-
jure the rights of others whose property would 
be affected by allowance of the zoning vari-
ance . . .  
(2) whether the variance 
will result in a substantial 
change to the character of 
the neighborhood or cre-
ate a substantial detriment 
to adjoining properties 
88-565-07-E. whether the zoning variance is 
being requested due to an intentional violation 
of this zoning and development code 
N/A 
 
As illustrated in Table 1, use of a generalized practical difficulty test does 
not directly track a specific ordinance.  It appears that the ordinance has stand-
ards that exceed the Highland Homes four-factor analysis on several fronts, as 
the Supreme Court of Missouri in Antioch recognized could be the case.  The 
trial court and the appellate court addressed the Highland Homes factors and 
found in favor of the Church,182 so looking at the remaining factors from the 
ordinance may be informative.  Two of these can be summarily dismissed.  
First, the practical difficulties are not the result of the Church’s action under 
section 88-565-07-A.  Essentially, the only action the Church took to put itself 
in this position was not selling the property as residential development oc-
curred around it.  This factor applies more closely to a practical difficulty, such 
as a lot being too small to support a structure, because the applicant sold the 
other half of the lot.  Likewise, the Church did not intentionally violate the sign 
ordinance under section 88-565-07-E.  It did not replace the display for the 
purpose of violating the sign ordinance – although it definitely should have 
checked for compliance first.  That some factors cut against the Church should 
 
 182. Antioch Cmty. Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, No. WD 79676, 2016 
WL 7209821, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2016), rev’d, 543 S.W.3d 28; Antioch Cmty. 
Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, No. 12CY–CV02727, 2016 WL 8416849, at *1 
(Mo. Cir. Ct. Apr. 7, 2016), rev’d, No. WD 79676, 2016 WL 7209821 (Mo. Ct. App. 
Dec. 13, 2016), rev’d, 543 S.W.3d 28.  Recognizing the request as for a non-use vari-
ance, the Western District, operating under an abuse of discretion review standard, an-
alyzed the KC-BZA’s determination using the practical difficulty framework set out in 
Highland Homes.  Antioch Cmty. Church, 2016 WL 7209821, at *4.  The court noted 
that the KC–BZA “made no findings to suggest that it rejected the Church’s unopposed 
evidence of practical difficulty.”  Id. at *3.  Due to the minor nature of the change to 
the sign, the court did not find the variance to be substantial.  Id. at *4.  Likewise, it 
found the digital display would not greatly impact the character of the neighborhood, 
considering the commercial development to the north and south.  Id.  Finally, the West-
ern District saw no feasible alternative for the Church.  Id.  Perhaps this lower court 
took a more utilitarian (and compassionate) approach than the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri’s recommendation that the Church simply find a younger member of the congre-
gation to manually change the letters on the sign.  Antioch Cmty. Church, 543 S.W.3d 
at 40.  The Western District found it unnecessary to address the final factor from High-
land Homes – whether granting the variance is in the interests of justice.  See Antioch 
Cmty. Church, 2016 WL 7209821, at *4. 
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not have been fatal to its establishment of practical difficulty; because they are 
factors, and not elements, each is merely part of a balancing process. 
Factor 88-565-07-B – “whether granting the requested zoning variance 
will result in advantages or special privileges to the applicant . . . that this zon-
ing . . . [C]ode denies to other land, structures, or uses in the same district” – 
must be addressed.183  An argument that all lots in a residential area cannot 
have a monument sign with a digital display – and that the Church is receiving 
a special privilege – certainly does not suffice.  This would be comparing enti-
ties that should be treated entirely differently.  In a residential zone, an institu-
tional use is not treated in the same manner as an actual residential use.  Only 
institutional uses in the residential zoning can have monument signs.184  The 
proper analysis is a comparison to other institutional uses, or, even more nar-
rowly, other uses of land to operate private places of worship. 
Factor 88-565-07-D likewise requires serious consideration.  A suspected 
response to allowing this variance would be that, due to the vast number of 
churches in residential districts, there would be an explosion of signs with dig-
ital displays.  However, this argument cannot be maintained.  The Church, alt-
hough in an R-6 neighborhood, is on a four-lane road and is a half-mile away 
from commercial development to the north and south.185  A more precise ex-
amination would compare similarly-situated parcels containing places of wor-
ship in the same residential zone.186  The resulting analysis would not reveal 
an apocalyptic proliferation of brightly-lit signs destroying the character of oth-
erwise quaintly-residential neighborhoods – even if those similarly-situated 
places of worship were also able to update their existing monument signs to 
add a digital display.  Across this residential zone, there is simply not a great 
number of similarly situated places of worship.  A BZA should weigh all these 
factors when determining whether to grant a variance. 
 
 183. KANSAS CITY, MO., ZONING AND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 88–565–07–B. 
 184. KANSAS CITY, MO., ZONING AND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 88–445–06–A.4(a). 
 185. See supra Part II. 
 186. The Kansas City, Missouri, parcel data layer shows 718 parcels that have a 
land use code of “Church.”  OPEN DATA KC, https://data.kcmo.org (last visited Feb. 26, 
2018) (The following datasets were used for this analysis: Cadastre and GIS Additional 
Features.  The Cadastre dataset contains the parcel boundaries and associated attributes.  
The GIS Additional Features Dataset contains zoning areas.  For each of these datasets, 
the site claims a last update of May 1, 2014; however, some attributes do appear to be 
more recent).  The land use could more accurately be classified as places of worship.  
To account for lot lines separating otherwise contiguous parcels, the dataset was sum-
marized on the attribute of the owner’s name and then “exploded” to account for similar 
ownership of non-contiguous parcels.  This yielded 680 total parcels as places of wor-
ship.  Id.  Overlaying these parcels on to the zoning divisions shows ninety-eight places 
of worship located in “R-6” zoning.  Id.  Of course, this number would include any 
inaccuracies in the data.  Of these ninety-eight, only seventeen are located next to a 
major road (within 100 feet of a road classified as a freeway or highway).  Id.  
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D. The KC-BZA’s Decision Was Clouded by Its Erroneous Determina-
tion of Lack of Authority 
The fact that the KC-BZA maintained the position that it lacked authority 
to grant the variance throughout the variance-request process demonstrates the 
real potential that, by digging in its heels on that ground, it did not properly 
consider the evidence put forth by the Church to show practical difficulties.  
Relevant portions of the hearing transcript are cited in this Section to illustrate 
this point before commentary on the consequence of such a course is given. 
The hearing transcript reflects that, at one point, a KC-BZA member com-
mented, “I think when this Code was rewritten not too long ago, it was the 
intent of the writer to say – and, again, I’m not an attorney – but it was the 
intent of the writer to say we really don’t want digital signs.”187  Following this 
comment, the KC-BZA went into a closed session “to seek legal advice.”188  
When the KC-BZA returned to open session, they proceeded to ask the Church 
about its practical difficulties, acknowledging that the issue of “whether th[e] 
[KC-BZA] ha[d] jurisdiction to vary the digital display sign” had not been 
ruled on yet.189 
After the Church presented an analysis of its practical difficulties and tes-
timony from a member of the board of commissioners for the Sherwood Estates 
Homes Association, a neighboring home association in support of the Church, 
the KC-BZA’s chairperson, while sympathizing with the Church, stated that he 
“fe[lt] that they h[ad] failed to establish undue hardship or practical difficulty 
as those terms are defined in law and, furthermore, d[id] not believe that the 
ordinance permit[ted] [the KC-BZA] to grant this request.”190  The KC-BZA 
voted unanimously to deny the variance.191  Prior to the vote and the above 
comment, the chairperson voiced his experience with the sign ordinance: 
I just want to make this statement before I ask the [KC-BZA] for a mo-
tion.  I’ve been on this board for about [thirteen] years and . . . I was 
part of the residence committee that worked . . . to redraft our ordi-
nances to bring them into a more modern condition . . . . 
The first digital sign case I remember was for a church . . . .  At that 
time we didn’t have the exact same language but that sign was denied. 
So because I personally have been involved and know the history be-
hind this ordinance . . . , I can tell the people that are present that a lot 
 
 187. Transcript of Meeting of Board of Zoning Adjustment, supra note 25, at 27. 
 188. Id. at 28. 
 189. Id. at 31. 
 190. Id. at 31–42. 
 191. Id. at 42. 
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of thought was put into this new ordinance and there was great conver-
sation about the fact that digital signs were appropriate in commercial 
[spots] but not residential zones.192 
This statement, along with the prior comment about the intent of the draft-
ers of the ordinance, suggests the KC-BZA superficially examined both the 
ordinance and the Church’s arguments.  First, these statements indicate that the 
KC-BZA may not have relied on the text of the ordinance but rather on what it 
believed the ordinance should reflect.  Second, these statements suggest that 
comparison was made with previously denied variances.  The point of a vari-
ance is to grant relief to a particular applicant.  Consequently, that analysis 
should be unique and not solely based on the results of previous variance de-
terminations.  Finally, these statements indicate that the KC-BZA did not at-
tempt to overcome the Church’s evidence pertaining to its presented practical 
difficulties.  However, as the Supreme Court of Missouri noted, it was not re-
quired to do so.  In Antioch, where there is relevant information presented by 
the applicant, coupled with a statement that the KC-BZA believed it lacked the 
authority to grant the variance, it seems more than plausible that adequate con-
sideration was never given for the fit of the Church’s arguments into the criteria 
and factors set forth in the Code. 
E. Approaching Institutional Use in a Sensible Manner 
Allowing electronic, changeable copy signs in residential districts via a 
conditional use permit would be a reasonable way to regulate the introduction 
of this type of sign for churches and schools in residential districts.193  Alter-
natively, allowing the use of electronic signs for assembly use – such as 
schools, churches, and community centers – regardless of placement in any 
zoning district would “provide a way-finding and informational function that 
helps people to locate a specific event or activity at a specific time.”194  Regu-
lations concerning many aspects of the sign placement and parameters of use 
– aside from regulation of content – could still be controlled through proper 
exercise of a city’s police power. 
On April 30, 2015, the Kansas City Council passed Ordinance 150312.195  
The ordinance expanded Kansas City’s Council Approved Signage Plan by al-
lowing an applicant exceeding specific acreage requirements to apply for the 
 
 192. Id. at 40–41. 
 193. See, e.g., COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT CITY OF MANHATTAN, 
KS, USER GUIDE TO THE SIGN REGULATIONS 14, https://cityofmhk.com/Docu-
mentCenter/View/29643 (last visited Oct. 5, 2018) (“In residential districts, Electronic 
Changeable Copy Signs are only allowed for Institutional Uses through a Conditional 
Use.”). 
 194. See, e.g., SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT, PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE 
CITY OF SAN JOSE SIGN ORDINANCE 9 (2009), https://www.sanjoseca.gov/Docu-
mentCenter/View/674. 
 195. Kansas City, Mo., Ordinance No. 150312 (Apr. 30, 2015). 
31
Neuman: A Sign to Many No More: Supreme Court of Missouri Casts Away Chur
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
1084 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
ability “to allow the installation of a noncommercial digital sign face on one 
otherwise allowable monument sign,” subject to compliance with a host of 
standards.196  The addition of the Council Approved Signage Plan to qualifying 
lots in residential zones was a response to allow updates that had already taken 
place on three school signs to remain intact.197 
This approach seems questionable at best.  Although lot acreage may cre-
ate a potential buffer to shield residential lots from negative impacts – and 
while the laundry list of fourteen items of required compliance, in theory, fur-
ther protects surrounding residential land use – the lot size requirement, in re-
ality, may make little difference.  Common sense dictates that a sign is still 
going to be alongside a road – even if subject to the required setback.  Resi-
dential lots across the street from a fifteen-acre lot with a sign are subjected to 
the same aesthetic intrusion as those residential lots across the street from a 
one-acre lot with the same sign.  A consistent approach – if consideration of 
preservation of a residential neighborhood is truly the concern – would be to 
require merely a specified distance from neighboring residential lot lines.  This 
distance could be considered in conjunction with, and even vary with, the char-
acter of the adjacent road and proximity to other signs – even if those signs are 
in adjacent zoning districts.  Requirements pertaining to the size of the sign, 
brightness and display change control, and hours of operation could still apply. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Eight years after the Church installed the digital display, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri held that the KC-BZA – an entity operating in a quasi-judi-
cial function that could not even correctly determine whether it had the author-
ity to grant this particular variance – correctly concluded that the Church did 
not demonstrate practical difficulty absent the grant of the variance.198 
 
 196. Id.  The size requirements covered the following parcels: “any lot zoned R 
containing a minimum of [fifteen] acres, or for any lot (or any two contiguous lots under 
common ownership) containing a minimum of [ten] acres, located adjacent to an arte-
rial (as shown on the major street plan).”  Id.  Among other provisions, these standards 
addressed the frequency of change of the signs message, transitioning of the message, 
brightness control, distance from other residential property, and no night-time opera-
tion.  KANSAS CITY, MO., ZONING AND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 88–445–11–E.8 (2018). 
 197. Kansas City Council Record for April 29, 2015, KAN. CITY. (Apr. 29, 2015), 
http://cityclerk.kcmo.org/liveweb/Meetings/Coun-
cilMinutes.aspx?q=m8VuJkOJiqdDdSDzeSCOMqR70wK3WiKPYXkKbRp-
BUXbkAxMmbodZhalZz7Y9qSgf9s8kkaz4WGI%3d (“This process was initiated 
when the North Kansas City School District erected 3 digital signs illegally.  They con-
tacted [a councilman,] and a narrowly worded Ordinance was introduced to allow those 
three signs to remain.  After much debate, a new Ordinance was drafted to address the 
land acreage threshold concerns voiced during the discussions for the first digital sign 
Ordinance.”); see also Horsley, supra note 3. 
 198. Antioch Cmty. Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 543 S.W.3d 28, 43 (Mo. 
2018) (en banc). 
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From one point of view, this case can be thought of as a city pursuing, all 
the way to the Supreme Court of Missouri, a case involving a variance centered 
around a single sign measuring three by three and one-half feet with all the 
time and money that endeavor entails – never mind the fact that the sign sits on 
a lot not far from an area that would allow the same sign.  Of course, that is an 
unfair characterization because adherence to a zoning ordinance provides some 
measure of stability in separation of uses across a city.  From a city’s perspec-
tive, allowing this sign could open the floodgates for other signs to follow.  
That characterization, too, is likely an exaggeration. 
One takeaway from this case is that times are changing and technology is 
advancing.  The outdated method the Church was using with its old sign was 
due for an upgrade.  The digital display it chose – one that is commonly used 
in a commercial setting and that represents an aesthetic upgrade – was certainly 
one more associated with modern advertising.  As these issues are only likely 
to proliferate in the future, cities should update sign regulations to provide spe-
cific guidance for digital sign conversions. 
However, the ultimate consequence of the Antioch decision is that no one 
really wins.  Now, a non-use variance can only be granted when “the applicant 
seeks to use the property for a specific permitted use but cannot do so without 
conflicting with the zoning requirement as to which the applicant seeks a vari-
ance.”199  This will likely come as a shock to every local jurisdiction as neigh-
bors begin to challenge BZAs’ grants of variances to applicants.  Sensible non-
use variances will no longer survive judicial review because the property could 
still be used for a specific permitted use.  At the same time, the “competent and 
substantial evidence” standard of review, as articulated here, is sure to encour-
age BZAs to operate with the assurance that a reviewing court will search the 
record and find a trace of support to uphold a variance denial.  This decision 
puts unnecessary rigidity into a zoning plan and clogs the safety valve that var-




 199. Id. at 38. 
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